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Q47Since recently Mozambique is actively developing its large reserves of coal, natural gas and hydropower.
Against this background, we present the ﬁrst integrated long-run scenariomodel of theMozambican energy
sector. Our model, which we name MOZLEAP, is calibrated on the basis of recently developed local energy
statistics, demographic and urbanization trends as well as cross-country based GDP elasticities for biomass
consumption, sector structure, vehicle ownership and energy intensity. We develop four scenarios to
evaluate the impact of the anticipated surge in natural resources exploration on aggregate trends in energy
supply and demand, the energy infrastructure and economic growth in Mozambique. Our analysis shows
that until 2030, primary energy production is likely to increase at least six-fold, and probably much more.
This is roughly 10 times the expected increase in energy demand; most of the increase in energy production
is destined for export. As a result, Mozambique may well become one of the leading global producers of nat-
ural gas and coal. We discuss the opportunities and challenges that this resource wealth poses for the
country.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Scenarios1 In an unpublished ministerial report, one of us drafted a rudimentary ﬁrst version of
an energy scenario study for Mozambique, based on data for the period 2000–2005
(Mulder, 2007). Other (consultancy) studies on energy planning in Mozambique, using1. Introduction
Since recently Mozambique is actively developing its large re-
serves of coal, natural gas and hydropower. Once developed, this
could make Mozambique an important player in regional and global
energy markets. The recent IEA Africa Energy Outlook refers to
Mozambique as an emerging large energy producer (together with
Tanzania), that soon will join the group of leading energy producers
in Africa, including Nigeria, South Africa and Angola (IEA, 2014).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently predicted that
Mozambique could become the world's third largest LNG exporter
after Qatar and Australia (IMF, 2016). In addition, the country main-
tains the fourth-largest untapped recoverable coal reserves in the
world, of which large-scale exploration started in 2011. In terms of
planned hydroelectric capacity, Mozambique is in Africa second
only to DR Congo. Against this background, we present in this paper aMahumane), p.mulder@vu.nl
. This is an open access article undernew integrated long-run scenario model of the Mozambican energy
sector. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst integrated
energymodeling and future planningmodel for Mozambique in the en-
ergy studies literature.1
Our scenariomodel is based on newly developed and locally collect-
ed energy statistics for the recent past as well as information about the
latest developments and future plans as regards the production and
transformation of energy inMozambique. These data are supplemented
with demographic, macro-economic and urbanization trends as well as
cross-country based GDP elasticities with respect to biomass consump-
tion, sector structure, vehicle ownership and energy intensity. The anal-
ysis makes use of LEAP, the Long range Energy Alternatives Planningdifferent frameworks, typically consider one subsector of the energy system, like for ex-
ample the electricity sector (EdM, 2004, MoE/Norconsult, 2009, Norconsult, 2011). In his
exploration of energy security dynamics for Mozambique, Chambal (2010) also focusses
on the electricity subsector when analyzing energy supply and demand, and does not pro-
vide an integrated energy modeling approach.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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consumption, production and resource extraction in all sectors of an
economy (Heaps, 2012). Hence, we name our model MOZLEAP. Our
analysis ﬁts in the literature of LEAP-based studies presenting energy
planning scenarios at the country level. Recent examples include studies
on China (Wang et al., 2011), Greece (Roinioti et al., 2012), Japan
(Takase and Suzuki, 2011) and Taiwan (Huang et al., 2011; Yophy
et al., 2011). In addition, and more often, LEAP has been used for
sector-level analysis in a country or region, often focusing on the
power sector (Bautista, 2012; Dagher and Ruble, 2011; Kale and
Pohekar, 2014; McPherson and Karney, 2014), but also on renewable
energy planning (Jun et al., 2010).
Our modelling period starts with historical trends since 2000 and
subsequently covers the anticipated surge in natural resources explora-
tion until 2030.Wemodel energy demand byhouseholds, transport and
extractive industries, as well as the sectors agriculture, manufacturing,
services, government and other. Also we specify electricity demand
from neighboring countries in the region, given their essential role in
developing the Mozambican electricity market. As regards the supply
side, we model electricity production on a project by project basis, as
well as gas exploration, coal mining, mineral (heavy) sands mining
and charcoal production.We use themodel to explore the potential im-
pact of the expected surge in natural source exploration on aggregate
trends in energy supply and demand, the energy infrastructure and eco-
nomic growth in Mozambique.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present
our methods: the modelling framework, the database that drives
our scenario model and the scenarios itself. In Section 3 we present
and discuss the main elements and results of our modeling exercise.
Section 4 presents in more detail the future prospects of energy
supply and demand. Section 5 concludes and discusses key policy
implications.2. Methods
2.1. Modeling framework
As mentioned in the introduction, our model makes use of the LEAP
framework. LEAP is intended as a medium to long-term modeling
tool, designed around the concept of long-range scenario analysis
(cf. Suganthi and Samuel, 2012).2 Ourmodel includes a historical period
that comprises the period 2000–2010, in which the model is run to test
its ability to replicate known statistical data. Subsequently, our model
generates multiple forward looking scenarios for the period 2011–2030.
LEAP supports a wide range of different modeling methodologies. In
essence, the LEAP accounting framework calculates (future) energy
demand as the product of activity levels (such as GDP, population,
physical production levels) and energy intensity per unit of activity. Our
energy demand modeling is based on a combination of historical energy
and activity level data thatwe collected and information on demographic
and urbanization trends supplied by external sources, locally collected
bottom-up information as regards future electricity distribution and
cross-country econometric modeling of GDP elasticities with respect to
biomass consumption, sector structure and vehicle ownership. Fig. 1
and Table 1 summarize, respectively, the structure of the MOZLEAP
modelling framework and the MOZLEAP model itself. In the next section
we describe this approach and its results in more detail.
On the supply side, we model electricity production, gas explora-
tion, coal mining and mineral sands mining on a project by project
basis. In addition, we develop and integrate into the LEAP framework
a simple biomass model to calculate future paths of charcoal produc-
tion and biomass consumption in Mozambique. On the demand side
we adopt a mix of these methodologies to model energy demand by2 For more information see www.energycommunity.org.households, transport and extractive industries, as well as the sec-
tors agriculture, manufacturing, services, government and other.
Also we specify electricity demand from neighboring countries in
the region, given their essential role in developing the Mozambican
electricity market.
2.2. Data
Most of the energy statistics for Mozambique that we use in our
analysis were collected and processed by the Directorate of Studies
and Planning (DEP) of the then Ministry of Energy in Mozambique
(MoE, 2012). The authors of this paper have been actively involved in
this process. Underlying data were solicited and provided by a range
of local institutions, including National Institute of Petroleum (INP), Na-
tional Company of Hydrocarbons (ENH), Mozambique Petroleum Com-
pany (PETROMOC), Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric (HCB), Mozambique
power utility (EdM),Mozambique Transmission Company (MOTRACO),
National Energy trust-Fund (FUNAE), South African multinational gas
and Oil company (SASOL), Matola Gas Company (MGC), Portuguese
Petroleum and Gas Company (GALP), VidaGas, National Institute of
Statistics (INE), Mozambique Petroleum Import (IMOPETRO) and the
Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD). Historical data on con-
sumption of traditional biomass have been estimated on the basis of
combined information from national survey data published by INE and
international data published by the IEA and FAO. In addition, we have
made use of previously published data on the energy situation in
Mozambique (Arthur et al., 2010, 2012; Atanassov et al., 2012;
Chambal, 2010; Cuamba et al., 2013; Cuvilas et al., 2010; Batidzirai
et al., 2006; Bucuane and Mulder, 2009; Brouwer and Falcão, 2004;
Schut et al., 2010).
Data on existing and future production of mineral resources (coal,
natural gas and mineral sands) were compiled on the basis of informa-
tion gathered from the then Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREME),
KPMG International (2013), United States Geological Survey (Yager,
2012) and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA/DOE). In
addition, we collected information from press releases by private
companies (in Bloomberg, Reuters, MiningWeekly, Mozambique Infor-
mation Agency-AIM, and other national press), as well as from personal
communications with local experts. Information on future electricity
trade in the region is based on information published in the Integrated
Resource Plan by the South African government (SA Department of
Energy, 2011) and interviews with local experts. Finally, demographic
and economic data onMozambique were obtained from INE, theMinis-
try of Planning and Development and the Mozambique Central Bank
(BM) as well as from the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF, 2013), the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (2011 Revision), and the African Development Bank
(AfDB). All locally collected data, insofar possible, have been checked
against data from international sources, including British Petroleum
(BP, 2012), International Energy Agency (IEA, 2013a, 2014), United Na-
tions Populations statistics and the World Development Indicators as
published by the World Bank.
2.3. Scenarios
Energy scenarios are self-consistent storylines of how an energy sys-
tem might evolve over time. Since this is, to the best of our knowledge,
the ﬁrst integrated energy modeling and future planning study for
Mozambique in the energy studies literature, we chose to develop in
this paper a limited number of scenarios that are intentionally fairly
simple and straightforward. Our main goal is to introduce our newly
developed scenario model MOZLEAP, and to use it for highlighting
major trends in the transformation of the emergingMozambican energy
sector, including the expected consequences for both domestic and
international energy markets. The development of richer scenarios, in-
cluding more detail and variation in terms of energy policies, structure
GDP builder
• GDP total
• Sector structure
Population projections
• Population size
• Household size
• % Urbanization
Biomass model
• Biomass consumption
• Fuelwood-Charcoal 
substitution
Transport model
• # Vehicles
Extractive industry
• Production
• Prices
Powerplants
• Capacity
• Efficiency
Energy intensity builder
• Exogenous, as function of time; 
• Endogenous, as function of GDP, urbanization
• Electricity demand
Electrification
• # new connections
Data, bottom-up project information, key assumptions
Modelling, data, key assumptions
MOZLEAP model
Resources Stock changes Transformation Demand by end-use sectors
CurrentAccounts (2000-2010) Scenarios (2011-2030)
Scenarios South Africa
Fig. 1. Structure of the MOZLEAP modelling framework.
277G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289of energy demand, energy supply mix options and regional differences,
is deliberately left for future work.
Energy outlooks usually give three basic scenarios – medium, high
and low – that are often largely deﬁned by GDP and population growth
expectations.We follow this approach, but add a fourth scenario that as-
sumes exploitation of Mozambique's natural resources exploration to
its fullest potential. We label our three basic scenarios as Reference,
Reference High and Reference Low. Reference is themost likely develop-
ment path. Development of GDP in the Reference scenario is based on
baseline projections plus activities of new extractive industry and
electricity generation projects that are (almost) sure to be realized,
taking into account realistic and somewhat conservative estimates
about the output price development in the extractive and aluminum in-
dustry. Furthermore, it adopts a medium variant of population growth
scenarios, a modest decline in household size, a moderate speed of
urbanization and somewhat conservative estimates as regards the de-
velopment of energy intensity improvements across sectors. Reference
High and Reference Low then refer, respectively, to the optimistic and
pessimistic variant of Reference – thus assuming higher (lower)
baseline economic growth, lower (higher) population growth, higher
(lower) speed of urbanization, faster (slower) decline of household
size and higher (lower) output price developments in the extractive
and aluminum industry. We refer to Table 2 for a brief summary and
overview or scenarios.
Finally, our Extractive scenario describes the expected evolution of
the Mozambican energy system if all potential projects of extractive
and aluminum industries as well as power generation are realized, in-
cluding those projects that are yet (very) uncertain. In other words,
this scenario tells the story of the Mozambican economy and energy
sector becoming very much extractive industry driven. Because of this
focus,we assume all other leading dimensions of themodel (populationgrowth, household size, speed of urbanization, energy intensity im-
provements and output price developments) to be equal to the Refer-
ence or Reference High scenario (see Table 2). This straightforward
set-up, again, is motivated by our aim to show the potential impact of
an extractive industry driven development path as caused by the mere
expansion of this activity rather than by (optimistic) energy intensity
changes or price developments. We leave it to future work to analyze
the potential impact of price volatility on international natural resource
and commodity markets on the Mozambican economy and energy sec-
tor, detailing the (future) evolution of international commodity price
variation across markets and sectors.
3. The scenario model
In this section we present the different parts of our scenario
model (see also Fig. 1) in more detail, and show how the expected
surge in natural resource exploration relates to aggregate trends in
economic growth, population growth, urbanization, biomass con-
sumption, sector structure, vehicle ownership and energy intensity
in Mozambique.
3.1. GDP builder
Together with population growth, per capita GDP is a key driving
force in our model. Evidently, on the one hand energy is an essential
production factor that fuels economic growth, while on the other
hand increasing standards of living lead to growing demand for
energy (GEA, 2012). In accordance with this, our model structure as-
sumes that across sectors growing GDP is associated with higher en-
ergy use. Also, we assume that total biomass consumption and fuel
demand for road transport are determined by GDP per capita, either
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Table 1
The structure of the MOZLEAP modeling framework.
Category, Sector Subsector Activity Energy type
DEMAND
Residential Electriﬁed # Households Electricity, LPG,
Kerosene, Charcoal,
Fuelwood
Non Electriﬁed # Households Kerosene, Charcoal,
Fuelwood
Agriculture Electricity, Diesel
Manufacturing MOZAL Metric Tonne Fuel Oil, Natural Gas,
Electricity
Other Industry GDP Fuel Oil, Natural Gas,
Electricity, Diesel
Services Commercial
Services
GDP Electricity, LPG,
Fuelwood, Charcoal
Public Lighting Not applicable Electricity
Government GDP Electricity
Extractive
Industries
Coal Mining Metric Tonne Electricity, Diesel
Natural Gas
Exploration
GDP Natural Gas
Mineral Sands
Mining
Metric Tonne Electricity, Diesel
Other Sectors GDP Electricity
Transport Road Passenger Cars # Vehicles Gasoline, Ethanol
Trucks # Vehicles Diesel, Methanol
Motorcycles # Vehicles Gasoline, Ethanol
Tractors # Vehicles Diesel, Methanol
Regional Electricity
Demand
South Africa Not applicable Electricity
Zimbabwe Not applicable Electricity
Other Not applicable Electricity
STATISTICAL DIFFERENCES
Primary All primary
Secondary All secondary
TRANSFORMATION
Transmission and
Distribution
Electricity,
Natural Gas
Electricity
Generation
Solar PV Electricity
Hydro Electricity
Thermal Natural Gas Electricity
Thermal Coal Electricity
Charcoal Making Existing Charcoal
New Efﬁcient Charcoal
Coal Mining Coal
Natural Gas
Exploration
Natural Gas
STOCK CHANGES
Primary All primary
Secondary All secondary
RESOURCES
Primary All primary
Secondary All secondary
278 G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289directly (in the case of biomass) or indirectly (in the case of road
transport, assuming that vehicle ownership is determined by per
capita GDP). Finally, we assume that in various sectors of our
model the evolution of energy intensity is a function of GDP growth,
reﬂecting the notion of increasing energy efﬁciency under economic
development (Lescaroux, 2011).
To model future development paths of GDP we developed a so-
called GDPbuilder that is embedded in LEAP's overall accounting frame-
work. We construct future GDP paths by combining a top-down and
bottom-up approach, as follows. We start with historical data from
existing sources (Mozambique Central Bank, National Statistics Insti-
tute, IMF, Worldbank) on Mozambique's total GDP and its sector struc-
ture for the historical period 2000–2010. From these data series we
derive historical GDP growth rates, excluding the extractive industry.
We call this baseline GDP growth. Subsequently, adopting a simple
Fig. 2. Per capita GDP across scenarios; Baseline GDP (left) and Total GDP (right).
279G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289top-down approach, for the period 2011–2030 we assume that baseline
GDP growth gtY
Base
follows a logistically declining trend as function of
time t, such that baseline GDP is deﬁned as:
YBaset ¼ YBaset−1 1þ gY
Base
t−1 e
–δt
 
; ð1Þ
with δ a parameter that determines the speed of decline in the logistic
growth curve. During the period 2000–2010 Mozambique experienced
rapid economic growth, on average about 7.5% per year for total GDP
and 5.5% for per capita GDP. We have updated our model with the GDP
growth rates for the period 2011–2015. The value of δ in Eq. (1) is
scenario-speciﬁc and chosen such that annual GDP growth from 2016
gradually evolves towards 3.8%–5.6% by 2030, depending on the scenarioTable 3
Key assumptions MOZLEAP model.
Reference
Medium Low
Unit 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2
GDP
Parameter δ 1/100 -- 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Unit price change
Natural Gas % -- 0.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.0
Mineral Sands % -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0
Coal % -- -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0
Aluminum % -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0
Population
Growth population % 2.45 2.36 2.25 2.13 2.01 2.60 2
Growth urban population % 3.23 3.39 3.50 3.50 3.45 1.69 1
Household size # 4.33 4.29 4.26 4.22 4.19 4.30 4
Electricity distribution
# New connections/year 1000 110 135 123 112 100 129
Losses⁎ % 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
δ: Speed of decline logistic curve of baseline GDP growth.
⁎ Transformation and distribution losses.(see also Fig. 2 and Table 3). Note that the sharp fall in GDP growth rates
and extractive sector contribution toGDP just after 2020, ismainly caused
by stabilized production quantities of natural gas, after a few years of
rapid expansion of natural gas production capacity (see section 4.1 and
Table A.4 in the Appendix ). Hence, the peak around 2020 in the two
graphs at the bottom of Fig. 2 reﬂects a rapid transition to a higher steady
state GDP level (see the top-right graph in Fig. 2), rather than a sudden
decline of macroeconomic performance.
Next, using a bottom-up approach, we construct GDP separately for
each extractive industry, as follows. First, based on the information in
our dataset (see Section 2), we specify per existing and planned extrac-
tive industry project the expected future production in physical units,Q.
We include in our model electricity production, gas exploration, coal
mining, mineral sands mining and the aluminum industry, whichExtractive
High
020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
-2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 -1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
.64 2.56 2.43 2.14 1.88 1.70 1.57 2.14 1.88 1.70 1.57
.75 1.75 1.73 5.08 5.25 5.26 5.18 5.08 5.25 5.26 5.18
.29 4.27 4.25 4.28 4.23 4.18 4.13 4.28 4.23 4.18 4.13
109 90 70 141 137 134 130 135 123 112 100
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
280 G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289transforms imported bauxite into aluminum for export. In Section 4.1
we describe the considered extractive industry projects in more detail.
Second, we calculate for each project the GDP value per physical unit
of production, p. To do so, we start with historical data until 2012,
which we subsequently extrapolate, assuming a simple but scenario-
speciﬁc trend based on expected international market prices of the pri-
mary resources involved (LNG, mineral sands, coal, aluminum). Third,
we estimate future GDP of the extractive industry by combining these
price trends gi ,t
pExtrwith expected physical production patterns per project
i, and subsequently aggregating over all projects, such that:
YExtrt ¼
X
i
QExtri;t p
Extr
i;t−1 1þ gp
Extr
i;t
 h i
: ð2Þ
Together with baseline GDP this sums up to total GDP:
YTotalt ¼ YBaset þ YExtrt : ð3Þ
This implies that total GDP growth rate is a weighted composition of
baseline and extractive GDP growth rates.
As regards the evolution of p, our extrapolation methodology as-
sumes a simple, scenario-speciﬁc, trend based on expected internation-
al market prices of the primary resources involved (LNG, mineral sands,
coal, aluminum). These prices are partly based on expert judgments for
the upcoming years, published in a variety of resources (IEA, 2013b;
KPMG, 2013), while for the remaining years price trends are assumed
to follow a straightforward but scenario-speciﬁc pattern, with annual
price ﬂuctuations varying between −2% and 4%. Given the expected
large relative size of the extractive industry in the future economy of
Mozambique, future price trends for primary resources are deliberately
designed to be conservative, in order to avoid an upward bias in future
GDP development paths. We refer to Table 3 for further details.
Finally, we construct a sectoral breakdown of aggregate GDP by cal-
culating future sector shares of four main sectors (agriculture, services,
manufacturing and government) as percentage of total GDP. The under-
lying idea, of course, is that economic development typically involves a
change in the sectoral composition of economies,with the industrializa-
tion process inducing a shift from the agricultural sector towards indus-
try, followed by a deindustrialization phase increasing the importance
of the service sector (e.g., Baumol, 1967; Maddison, 1991, 1999).
Again, our starting point is historical data for the period 2000–2011
from existing sources. Next, we assume that the respective sector shares
S evolve over time as a function of baseline GDP per capita, ytBase, accord-
ing to the following logistic curve:
S tð Þ ¼ St−1  1þ θyBaset
 ΔyBaset
ð4Þ
with parameter θ signifying the elasticity of the change in the sectoral
composition of the economyunder inﬂuence of economic development.
The value of θ is sector-speciﬁc and is derived from cross-country re-
gressions of the relation between per capita GDP and the respective sec-
tor share, using Worldbank data for 39 countries with per capita GDP
values between US$700 and US$3000; estimated coefﬁcients vary
from −2.94 for agriculture to 4.86 for manufacturing. We refer to
Table A.1 in the Appendix for details.
The results of our GDP calculations are summarized in Fig. 2. First,
this ﬁgure clearly shows that Mozambique is extremely poor but at
the same time experienced rapid economic growth over the last decade
and a half. For the period 2000–2015 the average annual growth rate of
GDP was about 7.4% (IMF, 2016).3 In that period, per capita GDP3 The very high growth rate in 2001 followed the very low growth rate of 2000 that was
caused by severe ﬂooding. The recent slowdown of GDP growth can be primarily attribut-
ed to a signiﬁcant decline of mining sector growth, reﬂecting lower international com-
modity prices and transportation constraints that prevented the scaling up in coal
production and exports (IMF, 2016).doubled from $250 to just over $500 (the latter equals to about $1100
in PPP terms). These levels roughly correspondwith 9% of the per capita
GDP level in South Africa and 2% of the per capita GDP level in the USA,
and imply that still about half of the Mozambican population lives
below the local absolute poverty line (Boom, 2011). In addition, Fig. 2
shows that our modelling of Baseline GDP (see Eq. (1)) leads to a grad-
ual increase of Baseline GDP per capita to levels of $700–$900 by 2030,
depending on the scenario. Extractive GDP per capita is expected to in-
crease dramatically over time, from almost zero in 2000 to $70–$90
after 2020 in the Reference scenarios, and up to $225 in the Extractive
scenario. Together these developments cause total per capita GDP to
be in the range of $750–1150 by 2030, depending on the scenario;
this equals a 50–125% increase from 2015 levels. Third, Fig. 2 shows
that GDP growth rates are expected to peak around 2020, especially in
the extractive scenario. This growth acceleration is largely driven by ex-
tractive industry expansion, most notably the assumption that gas pro-
cessing facilities in the Rovuma Basin, in the far north of the country,
will begin production around 2020. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) recently predicted that Mozambique's average growth rate dur-
ing the ﬁrst half of the next decade could reach over 20% per annum
(IMF, 2016). Given the political, ﬁnancial and technical uncertainties
in developing these gas ﬁelds, we work with more conservative as-
sumptions. Nevertheless, we predict growth rates of over 10%, of
which one third to almost halfwill be caused by the extractive sector ex-
pansion, depending on the scenario – as can be seen from Fig. 2. This re-
sembles the situation in the early 2000s when the extractive sector was
an important driving force of GDP growth, due to the opening up of the
Mozal aluminum smelter near the capitalMaputo. Together, our projec-
tions imply that over the next decade the extractive sectorwill comprise
about 10–20% of the total economy, depending on the scenario.
3.2. Population projections
Size and growth of the population helps deﬁne critical indicators in
our model, such as per capita GDP, the electriﬁcation rate, total residen-
tial energy consumption, and fuel consumption by passenger cars. In ad-
dition, these indicators are inﬂuenced by the composition of the
population in terms of the urban–rural divide and whether or not
households have access to electricity. Growth of population has been
calculated as the product of birth, mortality and netmigration statistics,
based on information from the National Statistics Institute (INE) that is
derived from national censuses 1997 and 2007, supplemented with
data obtained from local surveys on, amongst others, infant mortality
and HIV prevalence. Future projections of these various demographic
statistics have been obtained by INE through a combination of extrapo-
lating historical trends, collecting new data from local surveys (after
2007) and the use of demographic modelling software developed by
the UN and the US Census Bureau. Fig. 3 and Table 3 summarize our
key demographic indicators across the various scenarios.
As regards population growth, all our scenarios for the period
2011–2030 take as their starting point historic data for the year 2010.
In 2010 Mozambique's population was some 22.4 million in total, of
which almost 31% lived in urban areas; average household size was
4.3, average annual population growthwas 2.5%, with urban population
growing 3.2% per year. Subsequently, all scenarios assume population
growth to gradually decrease over time. In our Reference scenario we
expect average annual population growth to decrease to 2.0% in 2030.
In our Reference Low and High scenarios, we assume this number to
be 0.4 percentage point higher and lower, respectively; the Extractive
scenario is identical to the Reference High for all demographic indica-
tors (see Table 3). As a result, by 2030 total population size is expected
to be in the range of 33–37 million people, with 34.8 million people in
theReferenceMedium scenario (see Fig. 3). Growth of urban population
is expected to increase to 3.5% per year in 2030 in theMedium scenario;
in the Low and High scenarios we assume this percentage to be 50%
lower and higher, respectively (see Table 3). As a result, by 2030 the
4 The US$3000 cut-off criterion is chosen to avoid a potential bias in the estimated coef-
ﬁcients: the share of biomass in total energy consumption becomes in general very low in
countries where GDP per capita exceeds US$3000; in our scenarios per capita GDP in-
creases from about US$ 400 in 2010 to around US$1000 by 2030.
Fig. 3.Model results for population size, urbanization, electriﬁcation and household size.
281G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289percentage of urban population is expected to be in the range of 31–
49%, with 39.1% urban people in the Medium scenario (see Fig. 3).
This implies that in the Medium scenario the number of people living
in cities in Mozambique by 2030 is as large as 60% of the entire popula-
tion in 2010. Obviously thiswill not only reshape the urban landscape in
Mozambique over the next 25 years, but also transform (residential) en-
ergy demand. Finally, in all scenarios we assume the average household
size to gradually decrease under inﬂuence of income growth and urban-
ization, from 4.3 persons in 2010 to 4.13–4.25 persons in 2030 (see
Table 3 and Fig. 3).
The extent to which the Mozambican population has access to elec-
tricity is expected to change rapidly as a result of intensive (rural) elec-
triﬁcation programs and growing income levels. In our model the
electriﬁcation rate is endogenously determined by combining informa-
tion on electricity network expansion (number of new connections re-
alized) with population growth dynamics as described above. In 2010
the national utility EdM realized 100.000 new connections. In our Refer-
ence scenario we expect this number to increase to 135.000 in 2015,
and subsequently decrease to 100.000 in 2030. In our Reference Low
and High scenarios, we assume that in 2030 respectively 70.000 and
130.000 new connections will be realized (see Table 3). Given popula-
tion growth, this implies that in our model the (household) electriﬁca-
tion rate is expected to increase from 15% in 2010 to 34% – 45% in
2030, with 39% in the Reference scenario (see Fig. 3). We assume trans-
mission and distribution losses to remain at 5% as from 2011 (see
Table 3).
3.3. Biomass model
Tomodel future demand for fuelwood and charcoal we developed a
simple biomass model, embedded within LEAP's overall accounting
framework. Following micro-based evidence of household energy con-
sumption patterns in developing countries (Barnes and Floor, 1999;Barnes et al., 2005), we adopt a nestedmodel structure. First, we assume
that total biomass consumption is merely determined by GDP per
capita, thus considering substitution with modern energy forms (such
as LPG andelectricity) as function of relative prices a second-order effect
(Leach, 1992). Second, we assume that the choice for one of the two
dominant forms of biomass (fuelwood and charcoal) is driven by their
relative prices aswell as the urbanization rate (see Eq. (6)).More specif-
ically, we ﬁrst deﬁne the evolution of per capita biomass consumption B
over time t according to a logarithmic S-shaped curve, as follows:
Bt ¼ α 1þ βe–γY
Total
t
h i
; ð5Þ
where α is the initial value of B (in the year 2000), β is a constant
(vertical shift of the curve), and γ the elasticity of B with respect to
total GDP per capita, ytTotal. The value for α is estimated on the basis of
a combination of international data (IEA Energy Balances, 2010) and
local household survey data (Atanassov et al., 2012; INE, 2009), and
equals 10.5 GJ per capita. The values for β and γ are derived from a
cross-country logarithmic panel data regression of biomass consump-
tion on per capita GDP for the period 1971–2006, using IEA data for 74
countries with per capita values below US$3000; estimated coefﬁcients
for β and γ equal 0.0274 and 0.239, respectively.We refer to Table A.1 in
the Appendix for details.4 Next, we deﬁne the evolution of per capita
consumption of charcoal C and fuelwood F as follows:
Ct ¼ Btλt with λt ¼ λt−1 1þ ρð Þγ½  ð6Þ
Ft ¼ Bt 1−λt½  ð7Þ
282 G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289where λ is the share of charcoal in total biomass consumption, ρ is
the inter-fuel substitution elasticity (i.e. between charcoal and fuel-
wood) and γ is the annual growth rate urbanization. Historical
values for γ were derived from census data (INE, 2010), whereas
values for λ in the initial year (2000) and ρ were derived from local
household survey data (Atanassov et al., 2012; INE, 2009), with ρ
set at 0.03. Future values for γ are taken from expected urbanization
trends published by the UN in its World Urbanization Prospects (UN,
2008).
Finally, to allocate charcoal and fuelwood consumption across elec-
triﬁed and non-electriﬁed households, we implemented the following
assumptions. First, we assume that in 2000 all electriﬁed households
lived in urban areas, and that in 2011 the urban and rural electriﬁcation
rates were, respectively 55% and 5% (IEA, 2013a). Second, we assume
that 5% of total fuelwood consumption and 85% of total charcoal con-
sumption is consumed by urban households with the remainder being
consumed by rural households (Atanassov et al., 2012; Brouwer and
Falcão, 2004; INE, 2009). Third, we assume that fuelwood and
charcoal is consumed by, respectively, 33% and 80% of households in
urban areas, while 10% of households in rural areas consume charcoal.5
Finally, building on these assumptions we model future evolution of
biomass consumption per electriﬁed household btElec as a function of
changes in the total biomass consumption (Eqs. (4)–(7)) as well as
the change in urbanization rate U relative to the change in the electriﬁ-
cation rate E, according to:
bElect ¼ Δbt−1 1þ
ΔU
ΔE
 
: ð8Þ
Biomass intensity per non-electriﬁed household is subsequently de-
rived from total biomass consumption not consumed by electriﬁed
households.
Fig. 4 illustrates the working of our biomass model within the LEAP
framework for Mozambique. The left-hand side of Fig. 4 shows the evo-
lution of per capita biomass consumption as function of per capita GDP,
using actual values for Mozambique. Biomass currently is the principal
energy source for the majority of Mozambicans, coming from an esti-
mated 30.6million hectares of forests and representing 80% of the ener-
gy consumed by households (Chambal, 2010). In our model, total
biomass consumption declines with increasing GDP, following an
inverted S-shaped patterns as deﬁned by the logistic function of
Eq. (4). As regards its composition, with rising levels of per capita
GDP, consumption of charcoal increases at the expense of fuelwood
consumption, under inﬂuence of rising income and urbanization – up
to some income threshold level, after which it is substituted for modern
energy forms such as LPG and electricity. The right-hand side of Fig. 4
demonstrates the substitution of fuelwood for charcoal across basic
MOZLEAP model runs. In our baseline scenario (“Reference”) the per-
centage share of charcoal in total biomass consumption in
Mozambique increases from about 10% in 2000 (historical data) to al-
most 30% in 2030, thus decreasing the percentage share of fuelwood
fromabout 90% to 70%over the sameperiod. In the optimistic (high eco-
nomic growth) scenario (“Reference_High”) the expected percentage
charcoal by 2030 is over 40%, in the pessimistic scenario
(“Reference_Low”) it still is expected to double from 10% in 2000 to
20% by 2030.
3.4. Fuel for road transport
Wemodel fuel demand for road transport on the basis of the expect-
ed evolution of vehicle ownership over time, given the evolution of per
capita GDP and population as described before. To this aim we5 Note that rural electriﬁcation has a minor impact on switching of cooking fuel while
the opposite is true for urbanization, which is a major driving force for the choice of
cooking fuel.developed again a simple logistic function that is embedded within
LEAP's overall accounting framework. Following evidence from the
top-down transport modeling literature in developing countries
(Button et al., 1993, Medlock and Soligo, 2002) we assume the number
of vehicles per 1000 people to bemerely determined by GDP per capita,
thus considering (relative) fuel prices a second-order effect. More spe-
ciﬁcally, we deﬁne the number of vehicles V per 1000 people at time t
according to:
Vt ¼ Vt−1  1þ ψyBaset
 ΔyBaset
ð9Þ
with parameter ψ denoting the elasticity of the change in vehicle own-
ership under inﬂuence of economic development. The value of ψ is
derived from a cross-country logarithmic panel data regression of pas-
senger car ownership on per capita GDP for the period 1971–2006,
using data from the Worldbank Indicators database for 86 countries
with per capita values below US$3000; the estimated coefﬁcient for ψ
equals 8.7. We refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for details. In the
absence ofmore detailed datawe assume this parameter to apply equal-
ly to the evolution of passenger cars as well as trucks, motorcycles and
tractors.
Next we calibrate our model by combining this approach with data
on the annual evolution of registered vehicles in Mozambique and fuel
consumption in the recent past, supplied by, respectively, theMozambi-
can National Institute of Road Transport (INATTER) and the Ministry of
Energy (MoE, 2012). Fig. 5 summarizes the results of our methodology
for estimating future demand for transport fuels across the various sce-
narios. It shows that the number of vehicles per thousand people is ex-
pected to grow from just over 10 in 2010 to about 29–38 in 2030,
depending on the scenario. With increasing levels of per capita GDP,
the implied GDP elasticity of vehicle ownership in our model is
decreasing over time, from 2.5% in 2010 to about 1% in 2030. In short
these numbers mean that the total number of vehicles in Mozambique
is expected to increase four to ﬁve fold over the period 2010–2030,
from just over 370,000 to about 1.6–2.0 million, depending on the
scenario; of this total number of vehicles in 2030 in our model 63%
consists of cars and 22% of trucks.
Mozambique has a large potential for the production of biofuel,
given its climate and a vast amount of unused arable land. At this mo-
ment, biofuel production plays only a marginal role in the energy mix.
However, the country has adopted a National Program for the Develop-
ment of Biofuels to promote and use agro-energy resources for energy
and food security. In doing so, the government also aims to encourage
socioeconomic development and to reduce the country's dependence
on fuel imports (Cuamba et al., 2013; Ecoenergy, 2008; IRENA, 2012).
The program aims to progressively increase the proportion of biofuel
in Mozambique's domestic liquid fuel mix in three phases. The pilot
phase (2012–2015) is currently being implemented with a fuel blend-
ing mandate of 10% for bioethanol and 3% for biodiesel. An operational
phase (2016 to 2020) will follow, with 15% bioethanol and 7.5% biodie-
sel blending and conclude with an expansion phase (2021-onwards) of
20% bioethanol and 10% biodiesel blending. In our scenarios, we include
these phases, but take into account a 5-year delay to reﬂect the actual
situation.
3.5. Demand scenarios from South Africa
South Africa's power utility (Eskom)has identiﬁedMozambique as a
potentially important supplier of electricity in its Integrated Resource
Plan 2011 (SADepartment of Energy, 2011) to help addressing its future
supply-side challenges. Eskom is particularly interested in new hydro-
power from Mozambique, as the existing electricity generation mix in
South Africa is carbon-intensive. Already, the Cahora Bassa (HCB) dam
represents 40% of Eskom's carbon-free generation. One of the scenarios
in the IRP is to use 2600 MW of power from Mozambique, including
Fig. 4. Biomass consumption across scenarios – as function of GDP per capita (left) and its composition over time (right).
283G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–2892135 MW from the new hydro projects. Electricity purchases from
Natural Gas plants at the Mozambique-RSA border is not looked at in
the 2011 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). As of date, South Africa gets
92 MW from Gigawatt plant in Ressano-Garcia, and could get an addi-
tional 150 MW from Sasol's plant in the same area. According to the
IRP, South Africa needs an additional 90 GW of generating capacity by
2030, mostly from renewables. Therefore, in our Extractive Scenario,
we have modeled 3320 MW of capacity dedicated to Eskom, of which
1900 to 2100 MWwould have to be ﬁrm.
3.6. Energy Intensity builder
As noted before, the LEAP accounting framework calculates (future)
energy demand as the product of activity levels (such as GDP, popula-
tion, physical production levels) and energy intensity per unit of activi-
ty. Therefore, the ﬁnal building block of ourmodel is an energy intensity
builder that deﬁnes for each level of activity the corresponding energy
intensity values over time. For the period 2000–2010 energy intensity
values are calculated based on historical data regarding energy con-
sumption and activity levels on a sector by sector basis. Subsequently,
future energy intensity values for the period 2011–2030 are calculated
on the basis of a variety of simple assumptions, again on a sector by sec-
tor basis. In this ﬁrst integrated energy modeling and future planning
study for Mozambique we deliberately apply simple and straightfor-
ward assumptions that do not vary in itself across scenarios. This choice
is primarily motivated by our emphasis on exploring the potential im-
pact of the expected unique surge in natural resources exploration in
Mozambique on the country's energy supply and demand and econom-
ic growth prospects. Especially givenMozambique's current status as an
extremely poor country with a rapidly expanding energy sector, this
made us decide to leave a careful analysis of energy efﬁciencyFig. 5.Model results for vehicle ownership (left) animprovements in end-use sectors – although interesting and important
– for future research.
A summary of our assumptions as regards future energy intensity
trends across the various end-use sectors is presented in Table 4.We as-
sume that in a poor country like Mozambique electricity consumption
per household increases over time under inﬂuence of rising GDP, be-
cause growing household income leads to increasing demand for elec-
tric appliances such as refrigerators and air conditioning. As regards
LPG, we assume that consumption per household increases over time
under inﬂuence of rising GDP as well as the degree of urbanization, be-
cause growing household income leads to a shift towards modern
cooking fuels, while in developing countries LPG is a typical urban fuel
for logistic reasons. Furthermore, we assume that kerosene consump-
tion per household decreases over time, because of a gradual ‘autono-
mous’ substitution towards more efﬁcient and cleaner fuels like
electricity and LPG. Finally, future charcoal and fuelwood intensities
are derived from our biomass model. In short, we assume that total bio-
mass consumption decreases under inﬂuence of increasing per capita
GDP,while the share of charcoal in total biomass consumption increases
with income and urbanization at the expense of fuelwood.
For the Agriculture sector we assume that energy intensity increases
with about 20% over the course of 20 years, under inﬂuence of modern-
ization and mechanization. In the Manufacturing sector we assume de-
creasing energy intensity growth, driven by the opposing forces of
modernization and increasing energy efﬁciency. Under inﬂuence of in-
creasing domestic natural gas production, we assume that the share of
natural gas in this sector increases to 33% by 2030 at the expense of elec-
tricity and diesel shares; fuel oil plays a minor role. In the sector Com-
mercial Services, we assume that electricity intensity increases with
economic growth, while LPG consumption (in hotels and restaurants)
again also positively depends on the degree of urbanization – followingd GDP elasticity of vehicle ownership (right).
Table 4
Key parameter values Energy Intensity Builder.
Sector Fuel type Characterization Value or formula
Residential Electricity Increase It = I t-1*(1 + (0,1*ΔYt)
LPG Increase It = I t-1*(1 + ΔYt) *(1 + ΔUt)
Kerosene Decrease -5% per year
Charcoal Increase See Biomass model
Fuelwood Decrease See Biomass model
Agriculture Total Increase 0.65 MJ/GDP (End year value 2030)
Manufacturing Total Increase 2.4%/year in 2011, gradually towards 0% / year in 2030.
Commercial Services Electricity Increase 1% per year
LPG Increase It = I t-1*(1 + ΔYt) *(1 + ΔUt)
Fuelwood, Charcoal Decrease -3% per year
Public Lighting Electricity Increase It = I t-1*(1 + (0,5*ΔYt)
Government Electricity Increase 1% per year
Other sectors Electricity Increase 1% per year
MOZAL Total Constant 55.1 GJ/MT
Coal Mining Electricity Constant 27 kWh/MT
Diesel Constant 2 Liter/MT
Mineral Sands Mining Electricity Constant 600kWh/MT
Diesel Constant 2 Liter/MT
Tractors Total Increase It = I t-1*(1 + (0.05*ΔYt)
Other Vehicles Total Decrease It = I t-1*(1 + (−0.05*ΔYt)
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gradual substitution away from biomass consumption. Finally, we as-
sume that electricity intensity for Public Lighting increases with eco-
nomic growth. Also, in the sectors Government and Other we assume
that electricity intensity will rise under inﬂuence of economic growth.
Energy intensity in the extractive industry is determined by constant
values of electricity and diesel consumption per physical unit of
production.We assume constant energy intensity values and fuel shares
for the aluminum smelterMOZAL in the south ofMozambique, based on
historical data, becausewe do not expect changes in its production pro-
cess. Until recently MOZAL, which transforms imported bauxite into
aluminum for export, was responsible for about three quarters of total
electricity consumption in the country – and thus is a key feature of
(future) energy planning and energy policy in Mozambique.6 Actual
values for the mining activities originate from a combination of indica-
tive ﬁgures on open-cut coal mining and mineral sands explorations
reported in the literature (Bleiwas, 2011; SEE, 2009) and from personal
communications with local experts involved in mining activities in
Mozambique. Finally, fuel efﬁciency in road transport is assumed to
gradually increase over time under inﬂuence of economic development,
which stimulates increasing import of newer and thus more fuel
efﬁcient vehicles. In contrast, we assume that fuel intensity for tractors
increases because of the expected increasing use of heavy equipment
as economic development proceeds. As regards the fuelmix, we assume
a progressive use of biofuel in the domestic liquid fuel mix, adopting
biofuel blending mandates from the government of Mozambique,
taking into account a 5-year delay in accordance with the actual
situation.
The energy intensities for the different economy sectors, measured
as ﬁnal energy consumption (in tons of oil equivalence(toe)) by the re-
spective activity level (GDP inmillion US$), are presented in Table 5, for
the Reference and Extractive scenarios. The Table shows that according
to our model total energy intensity in Mozambique is expected to fall
rapidly until 2030. This aggregate trend is driven by the combination
of a few sector trends. First and most important, energy consumption
per household is predicted to fall with 20–30% in the period 2010–
2030. This decrease is mainly caused by the substitution of charcoal
and modern energy types for the inefﬁcient source of fuelwood. Given
that in Mozambique the residential sector is responsible for the major
part of energy consumption (see next section), this development6 For this reason, in our model we consider MOZAL to be part of the extractive industry
sector, although it is strictly speaking not conducting extractive activities inMozambique.
Often, MOZAL is considered to be part of the Manufacturing sector.obviously has a major impact on the evolution of aggregate energy in-
tensity. Second, energy intensity levels are expected to fall relatively
rapid in the Manufacturing and, especially, Extractive industry sectors.
Manufacturing energy intensity changes mainly under inﬂuence of an
increase in size and value added of manufacturing activities, starting
from a very small base. The exceptionally high energy intensity level
in the Extractive industry sector in 2010 is to be explained by its compo-
sition: the MOZAL aluminum smelter and the mineral sand exploration
project in northern Mozambique (in Moma) – both of which operate
highly energy-intensive processes. However, as the Table shows, energy
consumption per unit of GDP in the Extractive industry sector is expect-
ed to fall rapidly over time because of the expected surge of natural gas
and coal exploration, which broadens the production base. In contrast,
because of our assumptions the other sectors (except Road Transport
and Services) show a gradual increase of energy intensity over time.
4. Energy supply and demand projections
Using themodeling framework and assumptions as explained in the
previous sections, we present in this section in more detail the future
prospects of energy supply and demand in Mozambique, with its impli-
cations for the international energy markets.
4.1. Extractive industry developments
As was described in Section 3.1, we constructed extractive industry
GDP on the basis of a bottom-up approach, based on information for in-
dividual projects in electricity production, gas exploration, coal mining
and mineral sands mining. Below, we describe these projects in more
detail, since they constitute a key element in our scenario paths regard-
ing future energy supply in Mozambique.
As regards electricity generation, we consider in total 37 projects
with a total capacity of almost 11.000 MW. Hydro is and remains to be
the main source for electricity generation in Mozambique, with the
greatest potential lying in the Zambezi River basin at sites such as
Cahora BassaNorth andMphandaNkuwa (Chambal, 2010). The existing
capacity is around 2200 MW, of which 2075 MW is provided by the
Cahora Bassa (HCB) dam. In total we consider in our model 15 hydro
projects over the entire period 2000–2030, with a total capacity of
about 7579 MW. In addition, in the period 2011–2030 we consider
the construction of 12 natural gas ﬁred power plants with a total capac-
ity of 1114MW aswell as 6 coal ﬁred power plants with a total capacity
of 2150 MW. Finally, we include 101 MW from diesel generations and
1.2 MW solar power (cf. Cuamba et al., 2013). The latter reﬂects that
Table 5
Energy Intensity indicators.
Reference Extractive
Unit 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Household toe/hh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8
Agriculture toe/106 US$ 11.6 14.3 14.8 15.5 15.5 14.3 14.8 15.5 15.5
Manufacturing toe/106 US$ 748.9 546.6 403.0 318.0 266.5 544.9 464.4 354.3 282.1
Extractive Industries toe/106 US$ 3197.3 238.6 146.8 135.6 131.0 1996.2 601.4 325.8 270.2
Services toe/106 US$ 17.5 17.0 16.7 16.6 16.6 17.0 17.1 17.3 17.7
Government toe/106 US$ 8.4 8.9 9.3 9.8 10.3 8.9 9.3 9.8 10.3
Other Sectors toe/106 US$ 13.1 13.7 14.4 15.2 15.9 13.7 14.4 15.2 15.9
Road Transport toe/103 vehicles 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
Total Economy toe/106 US$ 758.0 451.4 348.8 333.8 326.1 638.6 491.8 385.9 319.9
285G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289over the last decade PV solar energy has been gradually adopted in
schools and health centers in rural areas, as well as in telecommunica-
tions businesses (Chambal, 2010). Next to its capacity, for each project
we deﬁne its transformation efﬁciency, expectedﬁrst year of production
and merit order. As regards the latter, we divide the modeling period
into four intervals and attribute merit order by expected ﬁrst year of
production in the basis of 5-years intervals, such that the value one rep-
resents existing power plants. Furthermore, the Reference scenario in-
cludes existing and very likely future power projects whereas the
Extractive scenario includes all 37 power projects, including those
whose realization is still fairly uncertain.We refer to Table A.2 in the Ap-
pendix for a detailed overview.
As regards the exploration of coal, our model includes in total 12
major coal mining projects with, in the Extractive scenario, a maximum
total estimated annual production of 108 million tons by 2030. In the
more moderate Reference scenario we consider 7 mining projects,
which together account for 57 million tons per year by 2030. We refer
to Table A.3 in the Appendix for details. For each mining project we de-
ﬁne it's expected ﬁrst year of production, the expansion of capacity over
time, and the destination of its production (export versus electricity
production).
As regards Natural Gas production, we of course start by modeling
the existing natural gas exploration project by the South African compa-
ny Sasol in the Pande & Temane gasﬁelds. As noted before, the vast ma-
jority of natural gas produced from these ﬁelds is exported to South
Africa through an 865 km pipeline. In addition, following the recent
gas discoveries in the Rovuma Basin, we include the future construction
of 12 so-called on-shore LNG trains plus 4 ﬂoating LNG units, each with
a capacity of 5 million tons per year. Of this total capacity, we include 4
LNG trains (equivalent to 20million tons per year) in the Reference sce-
nario. Total gas production in the Reference scenario is then anticipated
to reach just over 23million tons per year as from2018,which equals to
about 1200 million GJ. In the Extractive scenario gas production could
reach 65–80 million tons per year in the period 2025–2030, whichFig. 6. Total energy supply (left) andequals to about 4200 million GJ per year in 2030. A detailed list is pro-
vided in Table A.4 in the Appendix .
Finally, on the demand side we model the evolution of several
energy-intensive megaprojects, including ﬁve mineral sands mining
projects and the MOZAL aluminum smelter. In the Reference scenario
we assume that mineral sands mining only grows marginally from
current levels to reach 1.2 million ton per year, with production
conﬁned to the existing Moma-Kenmare project. In the Extractive
Scenario we include four new mining projects, with a total production
level of 9.5 million ton by 2030. A detailed list is provided in Table A.5
in the Appendix . As regards the aluminum company MOZAL, we as-
sume a constant physical production of 547 thousand tons per year in
the Reference scenario, and an expansion to 728 thousand tons per
year as of 2019 (often referred to asMOZAL-III) in the Extractive scenar-
io. In doing so, we implicitly assumed that by 2019, the Center-South
“Backbone” transmission line (CESUL) will be accomplished, such that
the major power plants from the Zambezi Basin in the North of
Mozambique are connected with the dominant economic center of the
Maputo area in the South of Mozambique.4.2. Energy supply and demand scenarios
Taken together, the aforementioned assumptions as regards
extractive industry evolution in Mozambique, in combination with the
previously described future development paths of GDP and population,
drive energy production scenarios in our modeling framework. In the
right-hand side of Fig. 6 we show that in the reference scenario we
expect total primary production to increase from almost 14 million
tons of oil equivalence (toe) in 2011 to 95 million toe in 2030.
If Mozambique were to follow the extractive scenario develop-
ment path, primary production could even increase to a level of over
180 million toe in 2030. This equals a 6 to 13-fold increase in primary
energy production in less than 20 years. Clearly, this means thatdemand (right) across scenarios.
Fig. 7. Total ﬁnal energy consumption by sector.
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its energy sector.
The left-hand side of Fig. 6 pictures the evolution of aggregate ﬁnal
energy demand across the various scenarios. It shows that in the Refer-
ence scenario total energy demand is expected to increase to over
12 million toe in 2030. This is a 70% increase from the 2011 level of en-
ergy demand, and equivalent to an average annual increase of 2.8% as
from 2011. If Mozambique were to follow the Reference Low develop-
ment path, total ﬁnal energy consumption is expected to reach almost
13 million toe in 2030, which equals an average annual increase of en-
ergy demand of 3.0% as from 2011. In contrast, the lowest level of ener-
gy consumption is to be expected if Mozambique were to follow the
Extractive Scenario development path – with an estimated total ﬁnal
energy demand of 11.9 million toe in 2030, implying a 2.7% average an-
nual increase over the period 2011–2030. The evolution of total ﬁnal en-
ergy demand in the Reference High scenario is very similar to the
Extractive scenario, notwithstanding differences in its composition.
It may appear at ﬁrst sight somewhat counterintuitive that in the
long run the Reference Low scenario yields a considerably higher level
of aggregate energy demand than the Extractive or Reference High
scenario – surely the latter scenarios include high economic growth
and extractive industry expansion. Underlying data, however, clearly
reveal that this result is to be explained entirely by the evolution of en-
ergy demand from the household sector – we illustrate this in Fig. 7.
Given the relatively small size of the underdeveloped Mozambican
economy, the residential sector is and remains responsible for a large
part of total energy consumption in Mozambique (over 90% in 2000
and 50–60% in 2030). Fig. 7 shows that residential energy demand con-
tinues to grow relatively strongover time in the Reference Low scenario,
whereas it decreases relatively rapid in the Extractive and Reference
scenarios. Hence, the diverging energy demand patterns in the right-
hand side of Fig. 6 are mainly caused by a straightforward scale effect:over time the number of households becomes much smaller in the
Extractive andReferenceHigh scenario than in the Reference Lowscenar-
io. This feature of our model of course follows from our assumption that
population growth is inversely related to GDP growth (see Section 3.2).
Consequently, it is in the high economic growth scenarios that theweight
of the dominant household sector in driving total energy demand de-
creases most. In addition, there is an intensity effect: household energy
intensity will decrease relatively rapidly over time in the high economic
growth scenarios, given that our model assumes that households substi-
tute away from inefﬁcient biomass consumption towards the use of
modern and more efﬁcient energy types like LPG and electricity under
inﬂuence of increasing per capita GDP (see Section 3).
As regards the non-residential sectors, Fig. 7 shows that road trans-
port is the second largest sector in terms of energy demand across all
scenarios. Also, it varies only to a relatively limited extent among the
various scenarios, with an annual growth of about 7%. As a result, de-
mand for fuel transport is expected to more than quadruple by 2030
as compared to 2010. Energy demandgrowth from the extractive indus-
tries is, of course, relatively strong in the Extractive scenario. According
to this scenario, by 2030 energy demand of extractive industries equals
over 1800 thousand toe, which is 80% more than in the Reference
scenario. As noted before, to a large extent this is driven by the
MOZAL aluminum smelter, which dominated the extractive industry
sector until 2011. By 2030, MOZAL is still responsible for, about 50% of
extractive energy demand in the Extractive Scenario; In the Reference
scenario this is even 70%. in the Reference scenario. This is equivalent
to 6–8% of total energy demand in the country in 2030, down from
11% in 2010.
Notwithstanding these high growth rates in demand, the true
revolution in the Mozambican energy sector unfolds on the supply
side, as noted before. To gain more insight in the consequences of the
rapid emerging energy production levels in Mozambique, we provide
Fig. 8. Total primary energy production by source (top) and destination (bottom).
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(top) and destination (bottom).
As can be seen from the upper part of Fig. 8, natural gas and coal to-
gether will make up for 80–90% of these production levels. In contrast,
at the turn of the century 80–90% of total energy production in
Mozambique consisted of wood, with hydro largely making up for the
remaining 10–20%. Nevertheless, according to our scenarios total ener-
gy production from wood and hydro is expected to increase 60–90%
over the next 15 years; yet the emergence of natural gas and coal are
causing their relative shares in total energy production to decrease to
about 3% (hydro) and 10% in 2030. The lower part of Fig. 8 shows that
80–90% of total energy production in Mozambique is expected to be
destined for export. This is especially true for the natural gas and coal
production, but to a lesser extent also for hydro, which continues to
be exported to South Africa and other neighboring countries in
the form of electricity (more on this below). The natural destination
for coal is India, but Brazil is also expected to be a market for
Mozambique's coal export (IEA, 2014). Of course, energy production
from wood and solar almost exclusively serves the domestic market.
5. Conclusions
We developed the ﬁrst comprehensive long-run scenario model of
the emerging energy sector of Mozambique. Our analysis made use of
the integrated modeling tool LEAP, to track energy consumption, pro-
duction and resource extraction in all sectors of the Mozambican econ-
omy. Hence, we name themodel MOZLEAP. It was our aim to introduce
themodel, and show its potential as a tool for energy planning and fore-
casting in the context of the emerging energy sector in Mozambique.
We have described how the calibration ofMOZLEAP is based on recently
developed local energy statistics and international data for the recent
past, aswell as on information about the latest developments and future
plans as regards the production and transformation of energy in
Mozambique. We have shown how future GDP paths were built froma combination of macro trends and bottom-up developments in the ex-
tractive industry. Moreover, we presented the key mechanisms that
drive ourmodel results, includingdemographic and urbanization trends
and cross-country based GDP elasticities with respect to biomass con-
sumption, sector structure and vehicle ownership. We have developed
four scenarios to evaluate the impact of the anticipated surge in natural
resources exploration on energy supply and demand, the energy infra-
structure and economic growth in Mozambique.
Our analysis suggests that until 2030, primary energy production is
likely to increase at least six-fold, and probably much more. This is
roughly 10 times the expected increase in energy demand; most of
the increase in energy production is destined for export. As a result,
Mozambique is rapidly developing into an important player at interna-
tional energy markets; it may well become one of the leading global
producers of natural gas and coal. We show that GDP growth rates in
Mozambique are expected to accelerate and peak around 2020, which
is largely driven by extractive industry expansion, most notably the ex-
pected start of large scale gas production in the Rovuma Basin, in the far
north of the country. The InternationalMonetary Fund recently predict-
ed that as a result Mozambique's average growth rate during the ﬁrst
half of the next decade could reach over 20% per annum (IMF, 2016).
Given the political, ﬁnancial and technical uncertainties in developing
these gas ﬁelds, we worked with more conservative assumptions, but
nevertheless predict annual growth rates of over 10% in that period.
Our projections imply that over the next decade the extractive sector
will comprise about 10–20% of the totalMozambican economy, depend-
ing on the scenario.
Consequently, the rise of its energy sector in principle would allow
Mozambique to transform the economy and accelerate itsmuch needed
development. The agriculture sector inMozambique still is the source of
livelihood for more than three-quarters of the population; agricultural
productivity is so low that Mozambique remains a net food importer,
and malnutrition is persistent. The country still ranks among the
poorest countries in theworld, with around half of the population living
288 G. Mahumane, P. Mulder / Energy Economics 59 (2016) 275–289below the absolute poverty line and evidence of stagnation in the reduc-
tion of poverty rates over the last decade (Ross, 2014). Substantial tax
revenues from extractive projects may help reduce the structural de-
pendence of the Mozambican government on international aid to ﬁ-
nance basic services and much needed investments in, among others,
health, education and infrastructure.
But the recent past as well as our scenario results show that the op-
portunity to use natural resource wealth for developing an inclusive
growth and development strategy in Mozambique poses major for its
government. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the existing en-
ergy strategy of theMozambican government has thus far been success-
ful to a limited extend only. Inter alia, this strategy aims for promotion
of new and renewable sources of energy, increased sustainable access
to electricity and liquid fuels, diversiﬁcation of the energy matrix, and
institutional coordination and consultation with relevant stakeholders
for better development (MoE, 2008). Our results show that the energy
matrix indeed becomes muchmore diversiﬁed over time, but it also re-
veals that evenwith large scale development of the natural gas, coal and
hydro potential, total energy production from traditional biomass will
increase with at least 60% over the next 15 years. This is caused by the
sustained dominance of the residential sector in total energy consump-
tion, under inﬂuence of the relatively small size of the non-extractive
economy in combination with high population growth rates. The latter
alsohelps to explain ourﬁnding that evenunder optimistic assumptions
the electriﬁcation rate is unlikely to exceed 45% by 2030. We have
shown that PV solar energy has been gradually adopted, but also that
it remains very small, percentage wise. A similar conclusion holds true
for the production and consumption of biofuels. According to Chambal
(2010), Mozambique has put in place a modern legislative framework
for the energy sector in general and the power sector in particular. How-
ever, he also concludes that implementation and enforcement appear to
lag behind considerably and some aspects are still unclear, particularly
the contribution that the energy sector is to make to poverty reduction.
Clearly, the current expansionary strategy for the energy sector in
Mozambique makes its economy increasingly vulnerable to a “resource
curse”, that may result from (a combination of) resource price volatility
on international energy markets, Dutch disease effects, crowding out of
productive investments, or discouragement of institutional and capacity
building in public administration (Van der Ploeg, 2011). Over the last
two years GDP growth already slowed down because of a decline in
mining sector growth, which was caused by lower international com-
modity prices and transportation constraints – the delayed develop-
ment of a new railway line and deep-water port that prevented the
scaling up in coal production and exports. Large scale development of
the country's hydroelectricity potential in the Zambezi river basin has
now been delayed for years, due to uncertainty about necessary long-
term demand agreements with neighboring countries in combination
with interregional network constraints. The Mozambican government
faces the challenge to balance the need for these and other natural re-
source related infrastructure with the need for investments in health,
education, water and agricultural productivity. Moreover, there is a
need to weigh the planned expansion of thermal electricity generation
capacity on the basis of coal and natural gas, against development of
the country's large hydroelectricity potential, also in view of the envi-
ronmental consequences of both strategies.
Until recently, megaprojects in the extractive sector contributed lit-
tle to ﬁscal revenues, but according to the IMF, by 2020 resource reve-
nues could exceed 40–50% of total revenues and would last for over
35 years (Ross, 2014). This would require major improvement of public
ﬁnancial management to ensure that resource wealth is used efﬁciently
and transparently, including the adoption of new ﬁscal rules that can
help safeguard the annual budget from price volatility (Van der Ploeg,
2014). In addition, it becomes increasingly clear that there is an en-
hanced need to manage existing regional imbalances in resource
wealth, which is concentrated in the far north of the country whereas
other economic development and political power is concentrated inthe far south of the country. Since recently, Mozambique is facing in-
creasing local institutional and political instability, which has its roots
in the country's devastating civil war during the period 1977–1992.
This includes returning instability in the central region of the country
led to attacks by armed insurgents on newly developed mining and
transport infrastructures as well as on main roads that connect the
northern and southern regions of the country. Large scale natural re-
source exploration is likely to increase these tensions, which underlines
the importance of developing an inclusive growth strategy that covers
all regions of the country. Certainly, this is much more easily said than
done, because institutional capacity in Mozambique is still weak in
many areas. To address the formidable list of challenges described
above will therefore require continued improvement of the quality of
public administration. Hence, the key question, therefore, seems to be
whether the expected natural resource boom will encourage or
frustrate the required improvements of local institutional capacity.
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